Unemployment, labor market reform, and monetary union

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calmfors, L
• 署名单位: Stockholm University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/319561
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 265-289
• 关键词: policy; EMU; DISCRETION; EMPLOYMENT; inflation; MODEL; rules

摘要

Monetary union, such as the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (EMU), may affect incentives for labor market reform, and thus equilibrium unemployment, through several mechanisms. If an inflation bias exists, there is usually a stronger incentive to reduce equilibrium unemployment through national reform outside rather than inside the EMU. Absent such a bias, EMU membership could lead to more reform. One reason is that reform may increase wage flexibility, which can substitute for monetary policy in the EMU. Another reason could be a precautionary motive for low equilibrium unemployment to reduce the utility cost of increased macroeconomic variability in the EMU.