Corporate tournaments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bognanno, ML
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/319562
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 290-315
• 关键词: compensation; pay; performance; incentives; firm

摘要

This study examines aspects of pay and promotion in corporate hierarchies in the context of tournament theory. Evidence supports the tournament perspective in that most positions are filled through promotion and pay rises strongly with hierarchical level. Furthermore, the winner's prize in the CEO tournament increases with the number of competitors for the CEO position. Not all evidence is supportive: the square of the number of competitors is negatively associated with the CEO prize. Additionally, firms do not appear to maintain shortterm promotion incentives, as lengthier time in position prior to a promotion reduces the pay increase from the promotion.