Bank runs and investment decisions revisited

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ennis, HM; Keister, T
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2004.09.006
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 217-232
• 关键词: banking panics; liquidity; INVESTMENT

摘要

We examine how the possibility of a bank run affects the investment decisions made by a competitive bank. Cooper and Ross [1998. Bank runs: liquidity costs and investment distortions. Journal of Monetary Economics 41, 27-38] have shown that when the probability of a run is small, the bank will offer a contract that admits a bank-run equilibrium. We show that, in this case, the bank will chose to hold an amount of liquid reserves exactly equal to what withdrawal demand will be if a run does not occur; precautionary or excess liquidity will not be held. This result allows us to show that when the cost of liquidating investment early is high, an increase in the probability of a run will lead the bank to invest less. However, when liquidation costs are moderate, the level of investment is increasing in the probability of a run. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.