Adverse selection and the financial accelerator

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: House, Christopher L.
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.02.008
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1117-1134
• 关键词: Adverse selection; Financial accelerator; credit markets; overinvestment

摘要

Many economists believe that credit market distortions create a financial accelerator which destabilizes the economy. This paper shows that when credit market distortions arise from adverse selection they sometimes stabilize the economy rather than destabilize it. The stabilizing forces are closely related to forces that cause overinvestment in static models. When investment projects are equity financed, or when contracts are written optimally, the distortions always stabilize the economy. Thus, stabilizing equilibria are a robust feature of the model. The empirical distinction between accelerator and stabilizer equilibria is subtle. Many empirical tests are unable to distinguish between accelerator and stabilizer equilibria. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.