Bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gorton, Gary; Huang, Lixin
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; City University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.05.015
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1613-1629
• 关键词: bank run; bank panic; lender-of-last-resort; bank coalition; Central banking

摘要

Central banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis, the lender-of-last-resort function. This activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems. Depositors lack full information about the value of bank assets, so that during macroeconomic downturns they monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic. The likelihood of panics depends on the industrial organization of the banking system. Banking systems with well-diversified big banks are less prone to inefficient bank runs because diversification alleviates the information asymmetry. In addition, big banks can self-monitor through publicly observable branch closure. Systems of many small banks form incentive-compatible bank coalitions to emulate the big banks during times of crisis. Such coalitions improve efficiency by monitoring member banks and issuing money that is a kind of deposit insurance-a precursor of central banking. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.