A multisectorial matching model of unions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Delacroix, A
• 署名单位: University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.02.002
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 573-596
• 关键词: trade unions; monopolistic competition; matching; wage premium; unemployment insurance

摘要

We develop an equilibrium matching model where unions have an important institutional presence. Monopolistic competition characterizes the goods market, where only some sectors are unionized. Thus, the model can vary the coverage of collective bargaining. It can vary the degree of coordination between unions, and alternatively consider national and sectorial unions. Calibration to the union premium implies a workers' rent extraction parameter much lower than assumed in the matching literature. We introduce unemployment insurance to study the interactions of policies with unions and find that unions only push for more generous benefits if this does not entail higher payroll taxes. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.