Search, bargaining, and employer discrimination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rosén, Å
• 署名单位: Stockholm University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/377018
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 807-829
• 关键词: wages; MODEL; unemployment

摘要

This article analyzes Becker's ([ 1957] 1971) theory of employer discrimination within a search and wage-bargaining setting. Discriminatory firms pay workers who are discriminated against less and apply stricter hiring criteria to these workers. The highest profits are realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Moreover, once ownership and management are separated, both highest profits and highest utility can be realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Thus, market forces, like entry or takeovers, do not ensure that wage differentials due to employer discrimination disappear.