Attribution and reciprocity in an experimental labor market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Charness, G
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/383111
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 665-688
• 关键词: partial gift exchange; fairness; COMPETITION; BEHAVIOR; game; preferences; intentions; equity; favor

摘要

The gift-exchange game has established that, in the laboratory, higher wages offered by an employer lead to considerably more costly effort provision. However, it is unclear whether this behavior reflects reciprocity or other forms of social preferences. This article tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. Treatments varied whether wages were chosen by the employer or by an external process. We see that both distributional concerns and reciprocity play a major role. The data are examined in the light of recent utility models.