International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Corsetti, Giancarlo; Guimaraes, Bernardo; Roubini, Nouriel
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.03.008
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 441-471
• 关键词: Lender of Last Resort; Bank runs; Speculative attacks; capital account crises; international monetary; fund

摘要

This paper analyzes the trade-off between official liquidity provision and debtor moral hazard in international financial crises. In the model, crises are caused by the interaction of bad fundamentals, self-fulfilling runs and policies by three classes of optimizing agents: international investors, the local government and an international official lender. Limited contingent liquidity support helps to prevent liquidity runs by raising the number of investors willing to lend to the country for any given fundamentals, i.e., it can have catalytic effects. The influence of the official lender is increasing in the size of its interventions and the precision of its information. Unlike the conventional view stressing debtor moral hazard, our model identifies circumstances in which official lending actually strengthens a government's incentive to implement desirable but costly policies. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.