From the invisible handshake to the invisible hand? How import competition changes the employment relationship

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bertrand, M
• 署名单位: Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/423153
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 723-765
• 关键词: product-market competition; UNITED-STATES; foreign competition; implicit contracts; job stability; wages; unemployment; industry; exchange; firm

摘要

Does import competition alter the extent to which employers, after negotiating workers' wages upon hire, subsequently shield those wages from external labor-market conditions? If increased competition induces a switch away from these wage implicit agreements, then (1) the sensitivity of workers' wages to the current unemployment rate should increase as competition increases and (2) the sensitivity of workers' wages to the unemployment rate prevailing upon hire should decrease. Using exchange-rate movements to generate exogenous variation in import competition, I find evidence supporting both of these predictions. I show that increased financial pressures on employers is one mechanism driving these effects.