How do firing costs affect worker flows in a world with adverse selection?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kugler, AD
• 署名单位: University of Houston System; University of Houston; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universite de Reims Champagne-Ardenne; Universite de Toulouse
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/383107
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 553-584
• 关键词: job search; EMPLOYMENT; LABOR; unemployment; turnover; security; MARKET; LITIGATION; layoffs; lemons

摘要

This article provides theoretical and empirical analyses of a firing costs model with adverse selection. Our theory suggests that, as firing costs increase, firms increasingly prefer hiring employed workers, who are less likely to be lemons. Estimates of re-employment probabilities from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth support this prediction. Unjust-dismissal provisions in U. S. states reduce the re-employment probabilities of unemployed workers relative to employed workers. Consistent with a lemons story, the relative effects of unjust-dismissal provisions on the unemployed are generally smaller for union workers and those who lost their previous jobs due to the end of a contract.