A model of (the threat of) counterfeiting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nosal, Ed; Wallace, Neil
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.02.006
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 994-1001
• 关键词: counterfeiting; matching model; Cho-Kreps refinement

摘要

A simple matching-model of money with the potential for counterfeiting is constructed. In contrast to the existing literature, lotteries are included. These provide scope for the operation of the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps. The application of that refinement is shown to imply that there is no equilibrium with counterfeiting. If the cost of producing counterfeits is low enough, then there is no monetary equilibrium. Otherwise, there is a monetary equilibrium without counterfeiting. In other words, the threat of counterfeiting can eliminate the monetary equilibrium. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.