Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie; Uribe, Martin
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.07.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1702-1725
• 关键词: Policy evaluation; optimal policy; nominal rigidities

摘要

Welfare-maximizing monetary- and fiscal-policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices, money, and distortionary taxation. The Ramsey-optimal policy is used as a point of comparison. The main findings are: the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest-rate rule plays a minor role for welfare. It matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium. Optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output. Interest-rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses. The welfare gains from interest-rate smoothing are negligible. Optimal fiscal policy is passive. The optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the Ramsey-optimal policy. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.