Vested interests and technology adoption

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bridgman, Benjamin R.; Livshits, Igor D.; MacGee, James C.
• 署名单位: Western University (University of Western Ontario); Western University (University of Western Ontario)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.01.007
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 649-666
• 关键词: vested interests; technology adoption; lobbying; CORRUPTION; cycles

摘要

The asymmetric ability of different interest groups to exclude non-members and the concentrated benefits and diffused costs of policies favoring vested interests matters for technology adoption. We analyze a political economy model where coalitions of workers in many small industries lobby government for a prohibition on the adoption of superior technologies. For reasonable parameter values, the smallness of industry lobbies leads to barriers to the adoption of technologies that would make all workers more productive. Higher government corruption can lead to lower levels of TFP and per capita output. The model can generate TFP growth cycles. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.