On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chari, V. V.; Kehoe, Patrick J.
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.06.032
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 2399-2408
• 关键词: free riding problem; growth and stability pact; time inconsistency; international cooperation

摘要

The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to following its policies. If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs. If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable. This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.