Bargaining and the value of money

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aruoba, S. Boragan; Rocheteau, Guillaume; Waller, Christopher
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.07.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 2636-2655
• 关键词: money; bargaining; search; inflation

摘要

Search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on Nash [1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155-162] bargaining, or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome, to determine the terms of trade. By considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a search model with divisible money, we show that the properties of the bargaining solutions do matter both qualitatively and quantitatively for questions of first-degree importance in monetary economics such as: (i) the efficiency of monetary equilibrium; (ii) the optimality of the Friedman rule and (iii) the welfare cost of inflation. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.