When knowledge is an asset: Explaining the organizational structure of large law firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rebitzer, James B.; Taylor, Lowell J.
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/510761
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 201-229
• 关键词: or-out contracts; silicon valley; COSTS; PERSPECTIVE; partners; GROWTH; MARKET

摘要

We study the economics of employment relationships in large law firms. Our point of departure is the property-rights approach that emphasizes the centrality of ownership's legal rights to control significant nonhuman assets of the enterprise. From this perspective, law firms are an interesting object of study because the key asset in these firms is knowledge, particularly knowledge of the needs and interests of clients. We argue that two distinctive organizational features of law firms - the use of up-or-out promotion contests and the practice of having winners become residual claimants in the firm - emerge naturally in this setting.