Retracting a gift: How does employee effort respond to wage reductions?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lee, Darin; Rupp, Nicholas G.
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; East Carolina University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/522906
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 725-761
• 关键词: us airline industry; labor-market; unemployment; inequity; exchange; fairness; performance; RECIPROCITY; COMPETITION; congestion

摘要

Since the days of Henry Ford, employers have argued that higher pay induces employees to provide additional effort. While the converse is also thought to be true, there is little empirical evidence testing this hypothesis. Not only are significant company-wide pay cuts rarely observed in practice but measures of employee effort are typically difficult to quantify. This article examines the effort responses of U. S. commercial airline pilots following a recent series of large, permanent pay cuts. Using airline on-time performance as proxy for unobservable pilot effort, we find only limited support for the hypothesis that pay cuts lower employee effort. There are lots of penalties to cutting pay. You lose the enthusiasm and loyalty of your work force. People measure success with pay. A cut in pay means you haven't been doing well.