Testing for asymmetric employer learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schoenberg, Uta
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/522905
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 651-691
• 关键词: Adverse selection; wage dynamics; labor-market; ability; layoffs; INFORMATION; EFFICIENCY; promotion; MODEL

摘要

Recent evidence suggests that employers acquire more precise information about a worker's productivity the more time he or she spends in the labor market. The following question arises: Is learning symmetric, that is, do all employers have the same information about workers' productivity, or is learning asymmetric, that is, does the current employer have superior information about workers' productivity? This article develops a learning model with endogenous mobility that nests both learning hypotheses. It then proposes new tests for asymmetric employer learning. Overall, learning appears to be mostly symmetric, except possibly when the employees involved are college graduates.