Opportunity counts: Teams and the effectiveness of production incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boning, Brent; Ichniowski, Casey; Shaw, Kathryn
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; CNA (The Center for Naval Analyses); Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/519539
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 613-650
• 关键词: human-resource management; performance; selection; INFORMATION; TECHNOLOGY; motivation; CONTRACTS; computers; systems; IMPACT

摘要

Using unique panel data on production lines in U. S. minimills, we analyze the adoption of problem-solving teams and group incentive pay and their effects on productivity. Almost every line ultimately adopts group incentives. However, problem-solving teams are found almost exclusively in lines with more complex production processes. Consistent with these patterns, fixed-effects models reveal increased productivity under group incentives in all lines, while teams raise productivity in lines with more complex production processes. This evidence indicates that teams give workers a valuable opportunity to solve problems in more complex production processes, while standard operating procedures appear to suffice elsewhere.