Why does capital structure choice vary with macroeconomic conditions?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levy, Amnon; Hennessy, Christopher
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.04.005
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1545-1564
• 关键词: financial structure; financing constraints; business cycles; INVESTMENT

摘要

We develop a computable general equilibrium model explaining financing over the business cycle. To avert agency conflicts, managers must hold a high percentage of their firm's equity. During contractions, firms substitute debt for equity in order to maintain managerial equity shares. During expansions, risk-sharing improves, with increases in managerial wealth facilitating substitution of equity for debt. In calibrated simulations, (counter) cyclical variation in leverage is only exhibited by less constrained firms. All firms exhibit financial accelerator effects. However, the effect is decreasing in financial flexibility. The model's predictions regarding financing and investment are consistent with empirical evidence. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.