Transparency, inequity aversion, and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams: Theory and evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mohnen, Alwine; Pokorny, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk
• 署名单位: University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/591116
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 693-720
• 关键词: Moral hazard; incentives; provision

摘要

We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as though they were purely selfish. However, when contributions are made transparent at an interim stage, agents exert higher efforts in the first period and adjust their efforts according to the interim information in the second period. This form of peer pressure reduces free riding, and thus more efficient outcomes are attained. The results are confirmed in a real effort experiment.