A rent extraction view of employee discounts and benefits

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marino, Anthony M.; Zabojnik, Jan
• 署名单位: Queens University - Canada; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/587761
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 485-518
• 关键词: market; monopoly; wages

摘要

We examine how firms can use employee discounts and perks to extract information rents from employees who have private information about their preferences and outside opportunities. The firm creates different bundles of the perk and salary in response to different employee characteristics and marginal costs of the perk. Strategic bundling can lead firms to provide perks even without a cost advantage over the outside market and to deviate from the marginal cost pricing. We characterize how optimal perk provision depends on the set of feasible contracts, on the perk's marginal cost, and on the perk's price in the outside market.