When to Start a Fight and When to Fight Back: Liability Disputes in the Workers' Compensation System

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Card, David; McCall, Brian P.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/598349
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 149-178
• 关键词: insurance

摘要

Contrary to the original intention of no-fault workers' compensation laws, employers deny liability for a substantial fraction of on-the-job injuries. We develop and estimate a simple structural model that explains the high rate of litigation as a consequence of asymmetric information. We estimate the model using data for a large sample of back injuries in Minnesota. Simulations under the counterfactual assumption that all denied workers pursue their claims suggest that the strategic incentive accounts for 30%-40% of observed liability disputes.