Performance Pay and Managerial Experience in Multitask Teams: Evidence from within a Firm

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Griffith, Rachel; Neely, Andrew
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/596324
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 49-82
• 关键词: incentive contracts; opportunity; INFORMATION; motivation; ability

摘要

This article exploits a quasi-experimental setting to estimate the impact that a commonly used performance-related pay scheme had on branch performance in a large distribution firm. The scheme, which is based on the Balanced Scorecard, was implemented in all branches in one division but not in another. Branches from the second division are used as a control group. Our results suggest that the Balanced Scorecard had some impact but that it varied with branch characteristics, and, in particular, branches with more experienced managers were better able to respond to the new incentives.