US tax policy and health insurance demand: Can a regressive policy improve welfare?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jeske, Karsten; Kitao, Sagiri
• 署名单位: University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2008.12.004
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 210-221
• 关键词: Health insurance; risk-sharing; Tax policy

摘要

The U.S. tax policy on health insurance is regressive because it subsidizes only those offered group insurance through their employers, who also tend to have a relatively high income. Moreover, the subsidy takes the form of deductions fro m the progressive income tax system giving high income earners a larger subsidy. To understand the effect of the policy, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents and an endogenous demand for health insurance. A complete removal of the subsidy may lead to a partial collapse of the group insurance market, reduce the insurance coverage and deteriorate welfare. There is, however, room for improving the coverage and welfare by extending a refundable credit to the individual insurance market. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.