Perfectly competitive bilateral exchange without discounting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Green, Edward J.; Zhou, Ruilin
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.01.001
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 121-131
• 关键词: Monetary bilateral exchange; Random matching

摘要

In a random-matching economy of traders who maximize cumulative consumption (overtaking criterion), the stationary, Markov, Bayesian-perfect equilibrium is studied. At Such equilibrium two results hold: (1) perfect substitutability between current and future consumption implies a no-surplus condition; and (2) by the no-surplus condition, there is a nominal price at which all trades must Occur. These results strengthen the seminal results of Ostroy (1973) regarding monetary bilateral exchange in two ways: the incentive compatibility of the equilibrium trading pattern is established and a less roundabout trading pattern enhances welfare by enabling Consumption to occur more frequently. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.