Banking panics and policy responses

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ennis, Huberto M.; Keister, Todd
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; European University Institute
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.04.005
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 404-419
• 关键词: Bank runs; limited commitment; time consistency; Suspension of convertibility

摘要

When policy makers have limited commitment power, self-fulfilling bank runs can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. We study how such banking panics unfold in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. A run in this setting is necessarily partial, with only some depositors participating. In addition, a run naturally occurs in waves, with each wave of withdrawals prompting a further response from policy makers. In this way, the interplay between the actions of depositors and the responses of policy makers shapes the course of a crisis. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.