Optimal taxation in the presence of bailouts
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Panageas, Stavros
署名单位：
University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.10.008
发表日期：
2010
页码：
101-116
关键词：
摘要：
The termination of a representative financial firm due to excessive leverage may lead to substantial bankruptcy costs. A government in the tradition of Ramsey (1927) may be inclined to provide transfers to the firm so as to prevent its liquidation and the associated deadweight costs. It is shown that the optimal taxation policy to finance such transfers exhibits procyclicality and history dependence, even in a complete market. These results are in contrast with pre-existing literature on optimal fiscal policy, and are driven by the endogeneity of the transfer payments that are required to salvage the financial firm. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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