Evaluating Education Programs That Have Lotteried Admission and Selective Attrition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engberg, John; Epple, Dennis; Imbrogno, Jason; Sieg, Holger; Zimmer, Ron
• 署名单位: RAND Corporation; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Pennsylvania; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/671797
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 27-63
• 关键词: large-sample properties; principal stratification; randomized experiments; school choice; causal; models; wages; identification; inference; variables

摘要

We study the effectiveness of magnet programs in an urban district that ration excess demand by admission lotteries. Differential attrition arises since students who lose the lottery are more likely to pursue options outside the school district than students who win the lottery. When students leave the district, important outcome variables are often not observed. The treatment effects are not point-identified. We exploit known quantiles of the outcome distribution to construct informative bounds on treatment effects. We find that magnet programs improve behavioral outcomes but have no significant effect on achievement.