One or two monies?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dong, Mei; Jiang, Janet Hua
• 署名单位: University of Manitoba
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.04.002
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 439-450
• 关键词: Record-keeping; money; private information; limited commitment; mechanism design

摘要

The set of incentive-feasible allocations is examined in a dynamic quasi-linear environment where agents lack commitment and have private information over their idiosyncratic characteristics. When record-keeping is available, the first-best allocation is implementable in a set of sufficiently patient economies. When record-keeping is limited to one money, this set is strictly smaller except when private information is absent. When record-keeping is expanded, but limited to two monies, the set of economies for which the first-best is implementable corresponds to that of record-keeping, even when private information is present. We further demonstrate that two monies are a perfect substitute for record-keeping. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.