Could making banks hold only liquid assets induce bank runs?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peck, James; Shell, Karl
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.04.006
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 420-427
• 关键词: Bank runs; Bank stability; Deposit contracts; Glass-Steagall banking; mechanism design; Portfolio restrictions; Sunspot equilibrium

摘要

Restrictions placed on bank portfolios are analyzed in a banking model designed to capture the role of checking accounts in facilitating transactions. Forcing banks to hold only liquid assets creates the incentive for liquidity-based runs. Even when a run does not occur, welfare is reduced as a result of overinvestment in the liquid asset. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.