Which workers get insurance within the firm?
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Lagakos, David; Ordonez, Guillermo L.
署名单位：
Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Yale University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2011.11.009
发表日期：
2011
页码：
632-645
关键词：
摘要：
Industry-level time series data suggest that low-skilled workers get less insurance within the firm than high-skilled workers. In particular, wages respond relatively more to productivity shocks in low-skilled industries than high-skilled industries. Our theory is that low-skilled workers get relatively less insurance from their firms because they have relatively lower displacement costs. Under limited commitment, lower displacement costs make the workers' outside options more attractive, and hence decrease the amount of risk sharing sustainable within the firm. Evidence on average displacement costs by industry support the theory's predictions. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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