Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bodenstein, Martin; Hebden, James; Nunes, Ricardo
署名单位：
Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.01.002
发表日期：
2012
页码：
135-149
关键词：
摘要：
As the nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero, a central bank with imperfect credibility faces a significant challenge to stabilize the economy in a New Keynesian model during a large recession. We characterize the optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate if credibility is imperfect. Confronting monetary policy communication of the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Swedish Riksbank with such a framework, the credibility of both institutions is shown to have been low in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. Published by Elsevier B.V.
来源URL：