Joint-search theory: New opportunities and new frictions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Guler, Bulent; Guvenen, Fatih; Violante, Giovanni L.
署名单位：
Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); New York University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.05.001
发表日期：
2012
页码：
352-369
关键词：
摘要：
The job-search problem of couples differs in significant ways from that of singles. We characterize the reservation wage strategies of a couple that perfectly pools income to understand the ramifications of joint search for individual labor market outcomes. Two cases are analyzed. First, when couples are risk averse and pool income, joint search yields new opportunities relative to single-agent search. Second, when spouses receive job offers from multiple locations and incur a cost when living apart, joint search features new frictions and can lead to worse outcomes than single-agent search. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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