Financial crises, bank risk exposure and government financial policy
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gertler, Mark; Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro; Queralto, Albert
署名单位：
New York University; Princeton University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.11.007
发表日期：
2012
页码：
S17-S34
关键词：
摘要：
A macroeconomic model with financial intermediation is developed in which the intermediaries (banks) can issue outside equity as well as short term debt. This makes bank risk exposure an endogenous choice. The goal is to have a model that can not only capture a crisis when banks are highly vulnerable to risk, but can also account for why banks adopt such a risky balance sheet in the first place. We use the model to assess quantitatively how perceptions of fundamental risk and of government credit policy in a crisis affect the vulnerability of the financial system ex ante. We also study the effects of macro-prudential policies designed to offset the incentives for risk-taking. (C) 2012 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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