Incentive-feasible deflation
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Andolfatto, David
署名单位：
Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Simon Fraser University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.03.002
发表日期：
2013
页码：
383-390
关键词：
摘要：
For competitive economies in which the real rate of return on money is too low, the standard prescription is to engineer a deflation that is, to operate monetary policy according to the Friedman rule. Implicit in this recommendation is the availability of a lump-sum tax instrument. In this paper, I view lump-sum tax obligations as a form of debt subject to default. While individuals may want to honor such obligations ex ante, a lack of commitment (the sine qua non of modern monetary theory) may prevent them from the following through on their promises ex post. When this is the case, there may exist an incentive-induced limit to deflationary policy. Published by Elsevier B.V.
来源URL：