Information manipulation and rational investment booms and busts
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kumar, Praveen; Langberg, Nisan
署名单位：
University of Houston System; University of Houston
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.03.001
发表日期：
2013
页码：
408-425
关键词：
摘要：
A model of endogenous investment booms and busts with rational agents is presented where outside investors are uncertain about both industry (aggregate) and firm-specific capital productivity, and insiders manipulate information through strategic productivity disclosures. For intermediate and high levels of agency conflict, there are aggregate investment distortions along the equilibrium path, investment dynamics are history-dependent, and depict patterns of persistent investment booms or investment busts even though investors design optimal incentive contracts based on Bayes-rational beliefs. Moreover, the aggregate uncertainty may not be resolved in the limit, as the number of firms and disclosures gets arbitrarily large. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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