Self-enforcing stochastic monitoring and the separation of claims
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cole, Harold L.
署名单位：
University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.05.003
发表日期：
2013
页码：
632-649
关键词：
摘要：
A model of self-enforcing stochastic monitoring with investment and production is developed. The optimal contract leads to debt-like and equity-like claims on the firm that are held by symmetrically informed outside investors and rationalizes the separation of these claims in order to efficiently generate the correct monitoring incentives. Self-enforcing monitoring leads to misreporting in equilibrium. While stochastic monitoring means that the failure to repay the face value of the debt can lead to either monitoring and bankruptcy, or the acceptance of a reduced payment, which corresponds to a settlement agreement. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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