Inattentive professional forecasters
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Andrade, Philippe; Le Bihan, Herve
署名单位:
European Central Bank; Bank of France; Universite de Caen Normandie
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
0304-3932
DOI:
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.08.005
发表日期:
2013
页码:
967-982
关键词:
expectations
imperfect information
Inattention
Forecast errors
DISAGREEMENT
摘要:
Using the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters to characterize expectations at the micro-level, we emphasize two new facts: forecasters (i) fail to systematically update their forecasts and (ii) disagree even when updating. It is moreover found that forecasters have predictable forecast errors. These facts are qualitatively supportive of recent models of inattention and suggest a setup where agents imperfectly process information due to both sticky information a la Mankiw-Reis, and noisy information a la Sims. However, building and estimating such an expectation model, we find that it cannot quantitatively replicate the error and disagreement observed in the data. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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