Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures and securitization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Adelino, Manuel; Gerardi, Kristopher; Willen, Paul S.
• 署名单位: Duke University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.08.002
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 835-853
• 关键词: Securitization; mortgage; foreclosure; RENEGOTIATION; asymmetric information

摘要

A leading explanation for the lack of widespread mortgage renegotiation is the existence of frictions in the mortgage securitization process. This paper finds similarly small renegotiation rates for securitized loans and loans held on banks' balance sheets that become seriously delinquent, in particular during the early part of the financial crisis. We argue that information issues endemic to home mortgages, where lenders negotiate with large numbers of borrowers, lead to barriers in renegotiation. Consistent with the theory, renegotiation rates are strongly negatively correlated with the degree of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders over the course of the crisis. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.