Managing Careers in Organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ke, Rongzhu; Li, Jin; Powell, Michael
• 署名单位: Lingnan University; Peking University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/693871
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 197-252
• 关键词: internal labor-markets; human-capital acquisition; personnel data; employer-size; external recruitment; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; empirical-analysis; wage policy; promotion; firm

摘要

Firms' organizational structures impose constraints on their ability to use promotion-based incentives. We develop a framework for identifying these constraints and exploring their consequences. We show that firms manage workers' careers by choosing personnel policies that resemble an internal labor market. Firms may adopt forced turnover policies to keep lines of advancement open, and they may alter their organizational structures to relax these constraints. This gives rise to a trade-off between incentive provision at the worker level and productive efficiency at the firm level. Our framework generates novel testable implications that connect firm-level characteristics with workers' careers.