Who Gets Hired? The Importance of Competition among Applicants

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lazear, Edward P.; Shaw, Kathryn L.; Stanton, Christopher T.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/694908
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: S133-S181
• 关键词: internet job search; labor-market; empirical-analysis; field experiment; DISCRIMINATION; unemployment; equilibrium; durations; promotion; marriage

摘要

Being hired into a job depends not only on one's own skill but also on that of other applicants. When another able applicant applies, a well-suited worker may be forced into unemployment or into accepting an inferior job. A model of this process defines over- and underqualification and provides predictions on its prevalence and on the wages of mismatched workers. It also implies that unemployment is concentrated among the least skilled workers, while vacancies are concentrated among high-skilled jobs. Four data sets are used to confirm the implications and establish that the hiring probability is low when competing applicants are able.