Debt maturity without commitment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Niepelt, Dirk
• 署名单位: Study Center Gerzensee; University of Bern; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.08.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: S37-S54
• 关键词: Debt Maturity structure; No commitment; default

摘要

How does sovereign risk shape the maturity structure of public debt? We consider a government that balances benefits of default, due to tax savings, and costs, due to output losses. Debt issuance affects subsequent default and rollover decisions and thus, current debt prices. This induces welfare costs beyond the consumption smoothing benefits from the marginal unit of debt. The equilibrium maturity structure minimises these welfare costs. It is interior with positive gross positions and shortens during times of crisis and low output, consistent with empirical evidence. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.