Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Loyalka, Prashant; Sylvia, Sean; Liu, Chengfang; Chu, James; Shi, Yaojiang
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; Peking University; Shaanxi Normal University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/702625
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 621-662
• 关键词: Incentives; tournaments; intervention; classroom; prizes

摘要

We present results of a randomized trial testing alternative approaches of mapping student achievement into rewards for teachers. Teachers in 216 schools in western China were assigned to performance pay schemes where teacher performance was assessed by one of three different methods. We find that teachers offered pay-for-percentile incentives outperform teachers offered simpler schemes based on class-average achievement or average gains over a school year. Moreover, pay-for-percentile incentives produced broad-based gains across students within classes. That teachers respond to relatively intricate features of incentive schemes highlights the importance of paying close attention to performance pay design.