When does a central bank's balance sheet require fiscal support?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Del Negro, Marco; Sims, Christopher A.
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2015.05.001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1-19
• 关键词: Central bank's balance sheet; Solvency; monetary policy

摘要

Using a simple, general equilibrium model, we argue that it would be appropriate for a central bank with a large balance sheet composed of long-duration nominal assets to have access to, and be willing to ask for, support for its balance sheet by the fiscal authority. Otherwise its ability to control inflation may be at risk. This need for balance sheet support - a within-government transaction - is distinct from the need for fiscal backing of inflation policy that arises even in models where the central bank's balance sheet is merged with that of the rest of the government. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.