Equilibrium matching and termination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wang, Cheng; Yang, Youzhi
• 署名单位: Fudan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2015.10.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 208-229
• 关键词: Optimal employment contracting; matching; termination

摘要

In an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard, jobs are dynamic contracts, job separations are terminations of optimal dynamic contracts. Transitions from unemployment to new jobs are modeled as a process of random matching and Nash bargaining. Non-employed workers make consumption and saving decisions as in a standard growth model, as well as whether or not to participate in the labor market. The stationary equilibrium is characterized. The model is then calibrated to the U.S. labor market to study quantitatively the worker flows and distributions, the compensation dynamics, and the effects of Ul system. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.