Optimized Taylor rules for disinflation when agents are learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cogley, Timothy; Matthes, Christian; Sbordone, Argia M.
• 署名单位: New York University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2015.02.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 131-147
• 关键词: inflation; monetary policy; learning; Policy reforms; transitions

摘要

When private agents learn a new policy rule, an optimal simple Taylor rule for disinflation differs substantially from that under full information. The central bank can reduce target inflation without much difficulty, but adjusting reaction coefficients on lagged inflation and output is more costly. Temporarily explosive dynamics emerge when there is substantial disagreement between perceived and actual feedback parameters, making the transition highly volatile. The bank copes by choosing reaction coefficients close to the private sector's prior mode, thereby sacrificing long-term performance in exchange for achieving lower transitional volatility. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.