Discussion of uncertainty, investment and managerial incentives by Glover and Levine

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gourio, Francois
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.11.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 138-142
• 关键词: investment; uncertainty; Managerial compensation

摘要

Glover and Levine provide an elegant framework to quantify the investment distortions created by managerial compensation. My discussion focuses on how one should model managers, on the potential endogeneity of managerial compensation, and on the macroeconomic relevance of the mechanism. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.