Financial crises, unconventional monetary policy exit strategies, and agents' expectations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Foerster, Andrew T.
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2015.10.001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 191-207
• 关键词: Unconventional monetary policy; Asset purchases; Exit strategy; Markov switching

摘要

A central bank may purchase assets during a financial crisis and then exit from those purchases. Agents have rational expectations about financial crises as rare events, the probability the central bank purchases assets, and the exit strategy. Selling off assets quickly produces a double-dip recession while slowly unwinding generates a smooth recovery. Expectations about the exit strategy influence the initial effectiveness of purchases. Increasing the probability of purchases during crises distorts the pre-crisis economy and depends upon the exit strategy. The welfare benefits of unconventional policy may differ ex-ante versus ex-post, as can the preferred exit strategy. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.